Les "bains de sang" furent plus qu'une allégorie,
pour Elisabeth Báthory, comtesse en Royaume de Hongrie

Olivier, instigatrice et complice active de Fourniret ?
Martin (compagne de Dutroux) craintive et désabusée comparse ?
C'est probable mais ce (ne) sont, à proprement parler, (que) des questions d'opinion(s) personnelle(s) et vraisemblablement, elles ne trouveront jamais réponses définitives.
Nombreuses sont néanmoins les personnes qui se sentent interpellées, et le malaise persistera même après le prononcé du jugement puisqu'aussi bien il s'agit de procès aux assises quand, en la personne des jurés appelés à délibérer en même temps que les juges, l'appareil judiciaire fait appel à l'opinion publique - parfois si difficile à cerner.
A cerner ? Mais que penser des personnes qui disent (comme l'accusé Fourniret lui-même l'aurait paraît-il souhaité) qu'une bonne morale appelle le huis-clos et qu'en l'occurrence il conviendrait de faire silence - non seulement comme c'est la règle, sur les discussions du Jury mais aussi, sur les débats publics et sur les auditions ?!
Etant donné les profils relativement différents d'Olivier et Martin, on peut cependant imaginer une ébauche de réponse.
Martin ne fut pas vraiment complice active de Dutroux, ni même collaboratrice appliquée - ce qui dans le cas contraire aurait pu sauver de l'inanition deux petites séquestrées (tant qu'à faire se peut.,) pendant une absence prolongée de Dutroux: mais hypothèse paradoxale, illusion sans aucun doute.!
Pour autant, les apparences sont là: sans rien préjuger, il ne semble pas que ce soit le cas d'Olivier, laquelle fut complice active de Fourniret, sinon même son instigatrice.
Ces personnes - et Fourniret lui-même? qui se sont prononcées pour le huis-clos: pensent-elles pouvoir faire échapper une femme (parce que c'est une femme?) aux rigueurs de la loi à travers sa concrète application par l'opinion générale, cette opinion diffuse qui gouverne au moins autant les consciences publiques que celles - plus officiellement réservées, des jurés?
Par-delà la sinistre mémoire du personnage de comte Dracula - contesté au plan de la vérité historique, il est cependant une figure historique incontestable (exception faite, précisément des dits "bains de jouvence") qui a fait déjà l'objet - non seulement d'un film dans la série "Contes immoraux", mais aussi de nombreux mémoires de spécialistes : Erzsébet Báthory
http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elizabeth_B%C3%A1thory

3.RÉCIT, par Stéphane Detaille - extrait du quotidien "Le Soir" Bruxelles - Belgique,le 14 octobre 2004,P.5

La survie de la population de Pitcairn dépend presque à coup sûr de la décision d'un tribunal devant lequel sept hommes - autant dire la moitié des mâles adultes recensés sur cette île de 47 habitants, répondent depuis plusieurs jours de fait de moeurs, de viols et d'agressions sexuelles: un total de 96 chefs d'accusation qui pourraient leur valoir la prison à perpétuité.
Six autres hommes, qui attendent d'être extradés d'Australie et de Nouvelle-Zélande, seront prochainement jugés pour des faits identiques.
Pitcairn est un archipel de 48 kilomètres carrés - cinq îles dont seule la plus grande est habitée, perdu dans les limbes du Pacifique à 2.160 km au sud-est de Tahiti. Ses habitants sont les descendants des célèbres "révoltés du Bounty": huit mutins anglais et dix-huit Polynésiens - dont douze femmes, qui sous la conduite de Fletcher Christian s'installèrent sur cette île déserte le 15 janvier 1790, après avoir abandonné dans une chaloupe leur capitaine William Bligh et ceux des marins qui lui étaient restés fidèles. La petite communauté réfugiée à Pitcairn ne fut découverte qu'en 1808 par le capitaine Folger, commandant du vaisseau américain "Topaz".
Le maire de l'île, Steve Christian - un descendant direct de Fletcher Christian, figure lui-même au nombre des accusés.
Le scandale a éclaté en 1999, lorsqu'une habitante s'est plainte d'abus sexuels à un policier britannique en visite sur l'île. Les enquêteurs allaient découvrir que ces pratiques étaient presque institutionnalisées à Pitcairn: une île dont la journaliste britannique Dea Birkett avait déjà dépeint les moeurs à tout le moins libérées dans un ouvrage - "Un serpent au Paradis", publié en 1997.
Des soeurs - écrivait-elle, partagent le même mari. Des adolescentes entretiennent des relations avec des hommes âgés. Des femmes ont des enfants avec plus d'un partenaire, souvent dès l'âge de 15ans.
Cette lecture ethnologique des faits dont elle a eu à connaître n'a manifestement pas infléchi la Haute Commission britannique qui administre l'île à partir de la Nouvelle-Zélande. Pas plus, du reste, que l'appel à la clémence lancé par treize femmes de l'île qui ont dénoncé "une erreur judiciaire":  nous considérions tous que le sexe, c'était comme de la nourriture sur une table a expliqué l'une d'elles.
Le procès des accusés a débuté le 29 septembre 2004 à Pitcairn devant un tribunal composé de trois magistrats néo-zélandais dont le voyage vers l'archipel a duré cinq jours. Huit plaignantes ont témoigné par vidéo-conférence - elles se sont réfugiées en Nouvelle-Zélande, des outrages qu'elles ont endurés dans le huis-clos azuré de leur îlot polynésien.
L'une d'elles a raconté comment, à l'âge de 11 ou 12ans, elle avait été violée à quatre reprises par le maire(*), Steve Christian. Les autres témoignages sont à l'avenant. Certains faits remontent à près de quarante ans.
Pour la minuscule communauté de Pitcairn, l'enjeu du procès dépasse de beaucoup le sort que le tribunal réservera aux accusés; tout en y étant intimement lié puisque la condamnation des sept hommes, sans parler des six autres qui attendent leur extradition, décimerait le seul équipage capable de manoeuvrer la barge qui assure l'approvisionnement de l'île.
A Pitcairn, la population n'est pas loin de percevoir, enfiligrane de cette affaire, le souhait de l'autorité britannique de voir les habitants abandonner une île dont l'administration lui coûte cher et ne lui rapporte rien: l'archipel tire l'essentiel de ses revenus de l'émission de timbres convoités par les philatélistes.
Les accusés dénient eux-mêmes à la justice britannique le droit de les juger, estimant que l'acte de mutinerie des "révoltés du Bounty" avait mis un terme à la souveraineté britannique sur leur propre personne.
Le "Privy Council" - la plus haute cour d'appel du Royaume-Uni, va donc devoir examiner  la juridiction et la composition de la Cour et du Tribunal, ainsi que l'applicabilité des statuts britanniques sous lesquels les accusés de Pitcairn sont pour suivis, a indiqué son greffier.
En attendant, le procès se poursuit a Pitcairn.
Une prison a été construite sur l'île qui n'en possédait pas. Elle sera transformée en hôtel si les accusés sont acquittés.(Avec AP et AFP)
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
* Comparaison n'est pas raison. Mais là, un je-ne-sais-quoi fait penser à cette affaire révélée dans toute sa dimension historique par Voltaire plus d'un siècle plus tard: celle des dits "possédés de Loudun" au XVIIe siècle, quand Urbain Grandier - curé de la place, fut accusé de sorcellerie puis brûlé vif. En fait il s'agissait d'un obscur règlement de comptes et d'une concurrence entre pouvoirs tutélaires.

"Rule Brittania - Brittania, Rule the Waves..!"
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3693574.stm
Les Naufragés du Bounty - l'autre épilogue ?
http://www.pitcairnnews.co.nz

RETOURS d'audience sur le présent article : voir dossier Skydrive Audience Pitcairn

Survie des "révoltés du Bounty"?
1.BBC-News (traduction libre, dite "non-autorisée")
Lundi, une Cour de justice appelée à débattre en appel de l'île d'outre-mer Pitcairn a
décidé que six de ses habitants étaient inculpés pour crimes sexuels.
L'affaire a attiré l'attention des médias du monde entier et a menacé de déchirer cette
communauté minuscule.
Avec une population seulement de 47 habitants, elle constitue l'une des sociétés les
plus isolées du monde - mais son étrange histoire apporte-t-elle des lumières sur sa
commune destinée ?
Des mutins se sont créé par eux-mêmes un nouveau foyer sur l'île de Pitcairn.
Christian Fletcher et sa bande de complices volontaires se sont révoltés sur le vaisseau
"le Bounty" (la Générosité) en 1789 et ont établi une colonie sur l'île de Pitcairn un an
plus tard.
Christian est devenu modèle d'un héros romantique pour nouvelles et poésies et
ensuite pour films à l'eau de rose avec Marlon Brando, Mel Gibson et Clark Gable,
tous jouant son personnage.
La société qu'il a établie après la révolte était perçue comme une communauté
insulaire idyllique, exempte des injustices de la vie maritime.
La Némésis de Christian, en la personne du capitaine William Bligh qu'il a refoulé à la
dérive sur l'océan pacifique, fut dépeinte comme un personnage de capitaine dur,
enclin aux violents accès de colère et prompt aux brutaux coups de fouet.
Mais la réalité est rarement celle d'une histoire si commode.

Bain de sang
Ces dernières années des tentatives ont été faites pour ressusciter la réputation de
Bligh aux dépens de celle de Christian. Ainsi Christian devient fou, drogué ou
secrètement homosexuel, tandis que Bligh est transformé en bénin, gentil capitaine
ayant à coeur le bien de ses marins. Quelle que soit la vérité de ces caricatures, ce qui
peut être tenu pour certain est que les années juste après la révolte furent sanglantes et
meurtrières.
Ces premiers Pitcairniers ont laissé un héritage d'indépendance et de bonne humeur
face à l'adversité.
Christian, avec huit autres mutins, six polynésiens, 12 femmes et un bébé, ont créé un
foyer sur l'île lointaine, rocheuse, inhospitalière de Pitcairn pour échapper aux cours
martiales et à l'exécution capitale presque certaine. Mais dans le laps de temps de trois
ans Christian aurait été assassiné par les polynésiens, irrités contre leur traitement
potentiel comme esclaves par les Européens.
Dans le massacre qui s'ensuivit tous les polynésiens furent abattus et trois autres
mutins perdirent également la vie. Ces premières années furent caractérisées par le
chaos. « Elles n'ont vraiment établi aucun genre de société » dit Herbert Ford,
directeur du centre d'étude de l'île de Pitcairn, basé en Californie. « Ils étaient tous
chefs - ils avaient des pistolets et ils avaient des femmes. Les polynésiens qu'ils ont
emmenés avec eux ont fort bien été traités comme esclaves et cette société de maîtres
et domestiques tourna bientôt au pire - le carnage devint un mode de vie. »
Jusqu'en 1800, quand la population masculine adulte de l'île eût été décimée jusqu'à
tout juste une personne - John Adams.

Évacuations
Adams était un homme en grande partie inculte, et d'après les informations reçues,
violent, qui mena la communauté depuis 1800 jusqu'à sa mort en 1829.
En dépit du fait qu'il participa au moins à l'un des nombreux meurtres sur l'île, il a
forgé une société intensément religieuse et bien organisée. « Adams a établi un genre
de théocratie, » dit le professeur Rod Edmond, expert en histoire du Pacifique sud à
l'université de Kent.
« Il était un patriarche vivant avec ce mélange hybride plutôt étrange de polynésien et
d'européen qui persiste bien jusqu'aujourd'hui. »
Les insulaires restent ardemment religieux - beaucoup sont maintenant des
Adventistes du Septième Jour.
Mais le monde extérieur ne pouvait être gardé au-dehors pour toujours. Adams avait
craint le surpeuplement et demandé l'aide des Anglais pour s'établir ailleurs. Deux ans
après sa mort la population entière de 66 personnes a été déplacée vers Tahiti. Mais la
plupart des insulaires revinrent six mois plus tard. Pitcairn a été annexé à l'empire
britannique en 1838 et fut à nouveau évacué dans les années 1850 à cause de
surpeuplement.
Mais plusieurs des familles descendant des premiers mutins sont à nouveau retournées
à l'avant-poste isolé, où plusieurs de leurs descendants restent encore.

Indépendance ?
Résister à l'interférence du monde extérieur a été leur mode de vie pendant deux
siècles. L'île fut choisie comme séjour précisément parce qu'elle avait été
inexactement marquée sur les relevés navals britanniques, la rendant difficile à
trouver.
Sept hommes - la moitié de la population masculine, font à présent face aux juges sous
le système légal britannique dans un auditoire de tribunal loin de plus de 10.000 milles
marins au large du Royaume-Uni.
Lundi, six d'entre eux ont été inculpés pour crimes sexuels, et un fut acquitté.
Les insulaires avaient construit une prison en préparation et les équipes juridiques ont
voyagé à Pitcairn depuis la Nouvelle Zélande. En dépit du carnage initial, dit Herbert
Ford, « ces premiers Pitcairniers laissèrent un héritage d'indépendance, d'amitié à tous
ceux qui viennent à leur rencontre, de simplicité et de bonne humeur face à l'adversité
». Beaucoup croient que les insulaires auront besoin de tout de cela et de beaucoup de
plus si leur communauté unique doit survivre à la dernière incursion du monde
extérieur.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3693574.stm
http://www.pitcairnnews.co.nz/

Epilogue, pour les premiers protagonistes inattendu, quoique prévisible pour
tout "sujet de Sa Majesté":
2.l'affaire judiciaire
Privy Council Appeal No 109/2005
(1) Steven Raymond Christian
(2) Len Calvin Davis Brown
(3) Len Carlisle Brown
(4) Dennis Ray Christian
(5) Carlisle Terry Young
(6) Randall Kay Christian Appellants
v.
The Queen Respondent
FROM
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF
THE PITCAIRN ISLANDS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
JUDGMENT OF THE LORDS OF THE JUDICIAL
COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL
Delivered the 30th October 2006
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Present at the hearing:-
Lord Hoffmann
Lord Woolf
Lord Steyn
Lord Hope of Craighead
Lord Carswell
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[Text omitted : on why, and how, judgment of appeal may occur; skipped 17 pp., 616
typelines (truly written or blank lines)]
The offences
I must now set out the offences of which the six appellants were convicted in greater detail. This needs to be
done to reveal the extent of the problem which lay beneath the surface when an allegation of rape was brought
to the attention of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1996 and Kent Police were asked to provide
personnel to investigate the allegation. Following an investigation which was conducted on Pitcairn by two
officers of Kent Police in September 1996 it was decided that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute the
suspect for the offence of rape. But he had admitted consensual intercourse with the complainant on six
occasions before and after her 12th birthday. This was contrary to section 88 of the Justice Ordinance 1966,
which makes it an offence on Pitcairn for any male person to have carnal knowledge with a female child of or
over the age of 12 years. It was also contrary to section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, assuming it to be
part of the laws of Pitcairn, under which it is an offence for a man to have sexual intercourse with a girl under
the age of thirteen.
For the reasons explained by Paul Treadwell, the legal adviser to the Governor of Pitcairn, in his letter to the
first secretary in the British High Commission in Wellington dated 5 January 1997, it was decided that the
suspect should be formally cautioned but not prosecuted for these offences. Section 88 of the Justice
Ordinance 1966 does not prohibit intercourse with a girl below the age of 12 years. So it was decided to draft
an indictment under sections 5 and 6 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. But Mr Treadwell thought it fair to
assume that the offender was unaware of the terms of these provisions of the 1956 Act and of the very
substantial penalties attaching to them. Furthermore no United Kingdom statutes were available to the public
on Pitcairn. It was a moot point whether they would be understandable by members of the public, even if they
were. As he put it, the decision not to prosecute was taken out of concern for the current state of the criminal
law on Pitcairn, and for its implications for the liberty of Her Majesty’s subjects on the island.
There had never been any British police presence on Pitcairn until the arrival of the Kent Police in 1996. So,
following this investigation, it was decided that a police officer should be sent to Pitcairn for a three month
tour of duty to train and support the existing Island officer who up until then had the sole responsibility of
policing the island. WPC Gail Cox was selected for this duty and she made her first visit to Pitcairn in
October 1997. It was as a result of her painstaking investigation under very difficult circumstances that the
extent of the child sexual abuse being practised on the island was revealed and the prosecutions brought that
have led to these appeals.
Four of the appellants were convicted of rape on counts brought against them under section 1 of the Sexual
Offences Act 1956.
Len Carlyle Brown (“Len Brown”), who was born in March 1926, was convicted of two offences of rape
committed between January 1969 and June 1972 when he was aged between 42 and 46, on each of which he
was sentenced to 2 years imprisonment. The complainant, who was the same individual in both cases, was
aged between 15 and 18 years when the offences were committed against her.
Stevens Raymond Christian, who was born in January 1951, was convicted of four offences of rape
committed against one complainant between September 1964 and October 1968 when he was aged between
13 and 17 and she was aged between 11 and 15 years, on each of which he was sentenced to 2 years
imprisonment. He was also convicted of one offence of rape committed between February 1972 and February
1973 when he was 21 or 22 against a different complainant who was 12 or 13 years old, for which he was
sentenced to 3 years imprisonment.
Carlisle Terry Young (“Terry Young”), who was born in October 1958, was convicted of repeatedly raping
the complainant between December 1977 and December 1981 when he was 19 to 23 and she was aged
between 12 to 15 years, for which he was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment.
Randall Kay Christian, who was born in March 1974, was convicted of four offences of rape committed
between September 1994 and October 1996 when he was 20 to 22 and the complainant, who was the same
individual in all four cases, was aged between 10 and 12 years, on each of which he was sentenced to 6 years
imprisonment.
Three of the appellants were convicted of indecent assault on counts brought against them under section 14 of
the 1956 Act.
Dennis Ray Christian pleaded guilty to one count of indecent assault under section 14 of the Sexual Offences
Act 1956 and two counts of incest between February 1972 and March 1974 when he was aged 15 to 17 and
the complainant was 12 to 14 years old, for which he was sentenced to 300 hours of community work and
placed under supervision for two years.
Len Calvin Davis Brown (“Dave Brown”), who was born in October 1954, pleaded guilty to two offences of
indecent assault under section 14 of the 1956 Act against one complainant and one against another which
were committed between January 1986 and January 1987 when he was aged 31 to 32 and the complainants
were aged 14 and 15 at the time of the offences. He was found guilty on a further six counts of indecent
assault between December 1989 and December 1991 when he was aged 35 to 37 and the complainant was
aged between 13 and 15 years. The Public Prosecutor conceded that the conduct in relation to four other
counts of indecent assault which were proved against him came within section 88 of the Justice Ordinance
1971, with the result that those counts were dismissed as they were out of time. For the offences of which he
was convicted he was sentenced to 400 hours of community work and placed under supervision for two
years.
Carlisle Terry Young was convicted of six counts of indecent assault under section 14 of the 1956 Act in
addition to that of rape. The indecent assaults were committed against three different complainants between
December 1972 and December 1991 when he was aged 14 to 33. In one case the complainant was only 5
years old when he began to touch her. In all the other cases the complainants were under 15 years old. He
was sentenced to six months imprisonment on the indecent assault charges, to be served concurrently with the
sentence of 5 years on the charge of rape.
Randall Kay Christian was convicted of four counts of indecent assault under section 14 of the 1956 Act
committed between October 1998 and February 1999 when he was 24 and the complainers were aged 14, for
which he was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment to be served concurrently with his sentence of six years
for rape.
Some indication of the scale of the sexual abuse that was found to have been perpetrated on Pitcairn can be
gathered from the ages of the men who were engaging in this practice and the dates between which the
offences were committed that were found to have been proved. The ages of the perpetrators range from 13 in
the case of Stevens Christian to 46 in the case of Len Brown. The offences were committed between
September 1964, more than 38 years before the charges in these proceedings were laid in Pitcairn Magistrate’s
Court in April 2003, and February 1999. Between them the appellants were convicted on thirty counts,
several of which involved a course of conduct that was repeated many times over against the same
complainant. It is impossible to believe that the appellants were not aware that what they were doing was
wrong. The Supreme Court was satisfied, after considering the material placed before it, that at all relevant
times Pitcairn was a developed society in which rape and sexual offending generally was known to be
criminal: para 108 of its judgment of 24 May 2005 as to promulgation of laws and related issues.
But the fact that this scale of offending, of which the offences that have been proved in this case was almost
certainly the tip of the iceberg, was tolerated for so long in such a small, isolated and closely knit community
is an indication of the poor state of supervision exercised over its affairs by the colonial authorities. To put
the scale of offending into context it should be noted that the population of Pitcairn in 1964 was 90, of whom
34 were men and 13 were girls under 16: A Guide to Pitcairn, Revised edition, 1970, Appendix 1. By 1989 it
had fallen to 55, of whom 18 were men and 9 girls under 16: A Guide to Pitcairn, 5th edition, 1990, Appendix
1. On the figures that the Board has been given it appears that the appellants comprise about a third of the
adult male population of Pitcairn. Further proceedings are currently in progress against three men in New
Zealand. It is scarcely credible that the population of the island as a whole was unaware of what was going
on. The Supreme Court, after studying the evidence in great detail in its judgment on the promulgation of
laws and related issues, concluded that in a community the size of Pitcairn issues of law and order and of
punishment could not have escaped the notice of the community at large, including youths as they grew up:
para 129. Nevertheless no steps were taken to deal with these offences until Kent Police began their
investigation.
The development of the Island’s legal system
The Board was provided with a wealth of material about the history and social conditions on Pitcairn from the
date when it was first settled to the present day, all of which was considered by the judges in the Supreme
Court and in the Court of Appeal with great care and attention to detail. It is impossible to summarise this
material in a few paragraphs, and I shall not attempt to do so. But a few points which stand out from the rest
must be mentioned to provide the necessary background.
Pitcairn, which is one of four widely scattered islands comprising the Islands of Pitcairn, is one of the most
remote communities in the world. It lies approximately midway between New Zealand, some 3,000 miles to
the west, and Chile, some 4000 miles to the east. Pitcairn is the only one of the islands in the group that is
inhabited. The nearest inhabited island lies in the Gambia Archipelago, some 300 miles to the north-west. It
is also very small, but quite high and rugged. It is about two and a half miles long and one mile wide,
extending to about 1100 acres. Much of the land slopes steeply to a peak of 1,140 feet, and only about 39 per
cent of the island is comparatively flat and arable. Consequently, although the soil is fertile and it has a
favourable climate, the island has never been able to sustain a population of more than about 200 people. In
recent years the population has declined sharply as islanders seek their fortunes elsewhere, particularly in New
Zealand
When Pitcairn was settled in about 1790 by 9 male Bounty mutineers, who were well aware that the
Admiralty would seek to bring them to justice, and the 19 Polynesians (13 women and 6 men) they brought
with them it was deliberately chosen as a place where they could avoid detection. It remained isolated from
the rest of civilisation for nearly two centuries. The shoreline is steep and rocky and there are no harbour or
port facilities. Nor are there facilities for any type of aircraft. Until about 1985 the islanders had no means of
communicating with the outside world, other than by transacting with visiting ships, except by radio using the
Morse code. They had no operative internal legal system for almost all the period of the island’s habitation
other than a local island magistrate assisted by two assessors, none of whom had any legal training. Apart
from one small book of Pitcairn laws, no legal texts, statutes or law reports were available on the island until
about 1997.
From time to time however various measures affecting Pitcairn have been passed in the exercise of the
authority conferred on Her Majesty in Council by section 2 of the British Settlements Act 1887 and the
authority given to it to delegate the power of making laws under section 3. The history was reviewed in detail
by the Supreme Court in its judgment on the promulgation of laws and related issues. It is unnecessary to
repeat all but a few of these details. The Pacific Order in Council 1893 applied English law to a defined area
in the Western Pacific which did not include Pitcairn. It conferred jurisdiction to deal with offences
committed within that area on the Court of the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific in Fiji. In 1898,
following the murder of Clara Warren and her one year old daughter on Pitcairn Island by Harry Christian, the
1893 Order was extended to include the area in which Pitcairn is located so that he could be put on trial for
these crimes. A new legal code and rules of procedure for the High Commissioner’s Court was introduced by
the Pitcairn Island Government Regulations 1940. It provided, among other things, for the election, powers
and procedures of a Council for the island and for the conduct of cases before the Island Court. All cases not
within the jurisdiction of the Island Court were to be heard and determined by the High Commissioner’s Court
for the Western Pacific in Fiji.
The Pacific Order in Council 1893 was revoked by the Pitcairn Order in Council 1952 which provided that the
Governor of Fiji was to be the Governor of Pitcairn. Section 5(1) of the 1952 Order provided that it was to be
lawful for the Governor to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Pitcairn Islands.
Section 5(2) provided that, without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by subsection (1), the
Governor was to have power to constitute a court in and for the islands with such jurisdiction as he might
think fit. Section 5(3) provided that all laws made in the exercise of that power conferred by the Order were
to be published in such manner and at such place or places in the Islands as he might from time to direct and
section 5(4) provided that every law was to come into force on the date when it was published.
The Judicature Ordinance 1961 terminated the Pitcairn jurisdiction of the High Commissioner’s Court for the
Western Pacific, conferred jurisdiction over Pitcairn on the Supreme Court of Fiji and constituted a
Subordinate Court for the Pitcairn Islands in addition to the Chief Magistrate’s Court constituted by the
Pitcairn Island Government Regulations 1940, which was to be presided over by a magistrate. By sections 7
and 8 of the 1961 Ordinance the substance of the law for the time being in force for the time being in and for
England was declared to be in force in the Pitcairn Islands, but so far only as the local circumstances and the
limits of the local jurisdiction permitted. At first sight this appears to be a general importation of the whole of
English law into Pitcairn, subject to that proviso. But its primary purpose, as indicated by its title, was to
confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court, to constitute an intermediate court “and for matters relating
thereto.”
On 14 April 1966 the Justice Ordinance 1966 was enacted by the Governor of Pitcairn relating to the
administration of justice and the preservation of order on the Islands. It provided for the constitution of an
Island Court, which was to comprise an Island Magistrate to be assisted by two assessors. It was to have
jurisdiction in both criminal and civil matters. But the maximum penalty that it could impose in the exercise
of its criminal jurisdiction was a fine of £25 or 100 days imprisonment, and it was not to hear or determine
proceedings for any offence unless the complaint relating to it was brought within six months after the time
when the matter of the complaint arose. Part X of the Ordinance contains a series of what may be described
as local offences dealing with a variety of matters such as contempt of court, perjury, assault, disorderly
conduct and stealing.
Among the offences in Part X of the 1966 Ordinance is section 88, which provides:
“Any male person who shall have carnal knowledge of any female child of or over the age of twelve years
shall be guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment for a hundred days.”
Section 1 provides that the word “child” means any person who is under the age of 15 years. Section 82,
which provides that a person who without lawful excuse assaults another person shall be guilty of an offence
and is liable to a fine not exceeding ten pounds, contains this proviso:
“Provided that if such assault is of such an aggravated nature, either by reason of the youth, condition or sex
of the person assaulted or by reason of the nature of the weapon used or the violence with which the assault
has been committed, that in the opinion of the Court such penalty is inadequate the court may substitute for
such penalty a fine not exceeding twenty five pounds or imprisonment for any period not exceeding one
hundred days.”
When Fiji became an independent state in 1970 the administration of the Pitcairn Islands was transferred to
New Zealand. The Pitcairn Order 1970 was made by Her Majesty in Council in the exercise of the powers
conferred by the British Settlements Act 1887 and 1952. It revoked the Pitcairn Order in Council 1952, but
without prejudice to the continued operation of any laws made thereunder and having effect as part of the law
of the Islands immediately before the appointed day: section 3(2). Section 4 of the Order provided that there
was to be a Governor of the Pitcairn Islands appointed by Her Majesty. In practice the Governorship of
Pitcairn has been conferred on the holder of the office of High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in
Wellington. Section 5(1) provided that the Governor was to have power to make laws for the peace, order and
good government of the Islands. Section 5(2) provided that, without prejudice to the generality of the power
to make these laws, he was to have power, by any such law, to constitute courts for the Islands with such
jurisdiction as he might think fit. Section 5(3), repeating the equivalent provision in the 1952 Order,
provided:
“All laws made by the Governor in the exercise of the powers conferred by this Order shall be published in
such manner and at such place or places in the Islands as the Governor may from time to time direct.”
In 1970, in the exercise of the powers conferred on him by the 1970 Order the Governor of Pitcairn made the
Judicature Ordinance 1970. It repealed the Judicature Ordinance 1961 which conferred jurisdiction on the
Supreme Court of Fiji, and created in its place a Supreme Court for the Pitcairn Islands with all the powers,
jurisdiction and authorities of the High Court of Justice in England which was to be deemed duly constituted
notwithstanding any vacancy in the office of any judge. It continued the jurisdiction of the Island
Magistrate’s Court. Sections 7 and 8 of the 1961 Ordinance to the effect that the law for the time being in
force in England were to be in force in the Islands so far only as the local circumstances and the limits of local
jurisdiction permit were re-enacted by section 14. But section 14(1) was more specific than the 1961
Ordinance had been as to what these laws were. It provided that the laws that were to be in force in the
Islands were to comprise:
“the common law, the rules of equity and the statutes of general application as in force in and for England at
the commencement of this Ordinance”.
The Supreme Court was provided with evidence showing the steps that were taken to publish, among other
measures, the Judicature Ordinances 1961 and 1970. The Judicature Ordinance 1961 was forwarded to the
Chief Magistrate on Pitcairn under cover of a letter written on the directions of the Governor which requested
that one copy of it be published on the public notice board and that the date of publication be notified by
radio. By telegram dated 9 October 1961 the Chief Magistrate confirmed that it had been published on the
notice board on 8 October 1961. The Magistrate confirmed by telex that the enactment of the Judicature
Ordinance 1970 on 27 October 1970 was followed by its publication on the notice board on 4 March 1971.
There had therefore been proper publication of the making of these Ordinances, as required by the Pitcairn
Order in Council 1952 and the Pitcairn Order 1970. But the Supreme Court accepted in para 95 of its
judgment as to promulgation of laws and related issues that at no time during the currency of the accused’s
offending was English law itself published on the Islands. None of the relevant statutes or legal texts were
sent to the island. Nor had any publications such as Halsbury’s Laws of England been provided. There is no
evidence that anyone on Pitcairn was aware of the provisions of sections 1 and 14 of the Sexual Offences Act
1956 prior to the commencement of the police investigation in 1996.
The position as to the promulgation of the Justice Ordinance 1966, which contained the series of local laws
already referred to, was markedly different. In March 1965 a draft of the Ordinance was discussed on Pitcairn
with the Island Council. Among other matters the law as to sexual offending was discussed. In a letter dated
22 November 1965 the Council were advised in general terms that if there was any matter not covered by the
law of Pitcairn the law of England could be invoked. They were also advised that the wording of section 88
had been left as the Council in March had wanted it but that they should remember that, as English law also
applied, a male who had carnal knowledge of a female child under the age of 12 would be liable to be
prosecuted under the English law of rape. At a meeting of the Island Council on 8 December 1965 the
Government Adviser, who chaired the meeting, read through the draft ordinance. A motion that it be
approved was accepted. On 10 December 1965 a telegram was sent from the Magistrate to the Commissioner
reporting to him that it had been approved in full by the Council.
The situation throughout the period of offending can therefore be summarised in this way. All the formal
steps that were needed to provide a workable legal system in the exceptional circumstances of Pitcairn had
been taken before September 1964 when the first of the series of offences was committed. The orders that
provided for the setting up of that system had been duly promulgated. The wording of the Justice Ordinance
1966, which set out the local offences that were thought at the time to be appropriate for Pitcairn, was
discussed in detail with the Island Council before the Ordinance was enacted by the Governor. But no steps
were taken to bring to the notice of the Island’s Council or its inhabitants, other than in the most general way,
any of the laws of England that might be invoked on Pitcairn to deal with any serious criminal matter not
covered by the Ordinance.
The prosecution
The offence of rape was known to the common law of England(*) long before it was provided for by
statute. So too was the offence of assault with all its aggravations, including that of indecency. It was not
until they were made statutory offences by sections 48 and 52 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861,
which sections 1 and 14 of the 1956 Act replaced, that the common law offences fell out of use in England.
The settlers of Pitcairn took the common law with them when they decided to settle there. As Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4th ed 1770, Vol 1, p 107, puts it:
“… it hath been held that if an uninhabited country be discovered and planted by English subjects, all the
English laws then in being, which are the birthright of every subject, are immediately there in force.”
So these offences, like murder, were already common law crimes on Pitcairn long before they were made
statutory offences in England. But the decision was taken to prosecute the appellants under the English
statute, not under the common law.
It appears too that many of the offences of which the appellants were convicted under the 1956 Act could
have been charged against them under the Justice Ordinance 1966, although the sentences that could have
been imposed would of course have been much more lenient and questions would have arisen as to whether
the prosecutions were out of time. The offences of which they were convicted under section 14 of the 1956
Act could have been charged against them as aggravated assaults contrary to section 82 of the Ordinance.
Seven of the twelve offences of rape of which they were convicted could have been brought against them
under section 88 of the Ordinance, as in those cases the complainers were all of or over the age of twelve
years. No complaint on the grounds of non-promulgation or abuse of process could have been made if these
offences had been prosecuted in the Islands Court under the 1966 Ordinance. But the decision was taken to
prosecute all but a handful of these offences under the 1956 Act. How did this come about?
Reference is made in the written case for Stevens Christian and Len Brown to the documentary evidence that
was before the Supreme Court as to discussions that took place in correspondence between the Governor of
Pitcairn and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (“the FCO”) in London about the action that ought to be
taken when the first of these offences came to light. In a letter to the FCO dated 16 December 1999 the
Governor noted that the sentences that were available under the existing laws in Pitcairn (under the Justice
Ordinance 1966) were quite inadequate to the seriousness of the offences. In a letter to the Deputy Governor
dated 29 April 2000 Paul Treadwell, the legal adviser, said that the public interest required that such serious
offences against the person should be detected and punished, even though the destruction that might result
within the tiny island community seemed incalculable. He also mentioned that there were obvious reasons for
searching for a path of compromise, among which was the fact that it was possible to attribute a degree of
responsibility for the unbridled sexual licence of Pitcairn men over past generations to the absence of any
meaningful civil authority and actual system of justice representing the guidance and supervision of the
colonial power.
In a further letter to the FCO dated 1 May 2000 the Acting Governor expressed concern as to whether it would
be practicable or desirable to investigate a whole raft of offences going back many years when, given the
timescale, it would be difficult to treat everyone even-handedly. She also acknowledged the validity of Paul
Treadwell’s suggestion that the situation was partly of the colonial power’s own making:
“There is no civil authority on the island. Governors, Deputy-Governors and Commissioners reside 3000
miles away in New Zealand, visit irregularly and for short periods of a few days only. The schoolteacher
(from New Zealand) doubles as the Government Adviser. But is not viewed by the islanders as being in a
position of real authority. We rely on a local Police Officer – who is related to every member of the
community they serve – to uphold the law which, until we began a comprehensive review with the assistance
of the Good Government Fund (in 1998), was in any case unworkable. Recent media reports have underlined
the islanders’ views on their remoteness from the UK. Perhaps, therefore, it is not altogether surprising that if
the community does not see the laws as applicable to them.”
She concluded however that all the allegations had to be investigated thoroughly, and that if, as had been
suggested, the line of offending that had been revealed was a cultural trait, an end had to be put to it once and
for all.
Suggestions that the offenders should be offered an amnesty were rejected and the matter was put into the
hands of the public prosecutor. One can infer that the decision to bring these prosecutions under the 1956 Act
was reached out of a desire to deal even-handedly with all the offenders, and to root out the cultural trait once
and for all by seeking convictions under legislation that would enable sentences to be imposed that gave full
weight to the gravity of the crimes that had been committed. These were laudable aims. But they give rise to
an important and difficult issue as to whether the law under which the offenders were to be prosecuted had
been sufficiently promulgated in Pitcairn for it to be permissible for them to be dealt with in this way.
Incorporation by reference
The method that was chosen to make laws for Pitcairn by means of the Judicature Ordinance 1970 was
incorporation by reference, in the most general terms, of all the statutes of general application in force in
England at the commencement of the Ordinance but only so far as local circumstances permit. The problem
does not lie in the meaning of the words that were used in section 14 to bring this about. Sir Kenneth
Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law, 1966, p 545 said that if the phrase “statutes of general
application” were to be offered as a novelty to a legislative draftsman today he would disclaim responsibility
for its consequences unless it were defined. But he acknowledged that it had been in use for many decades,
that it does not appear to have given the courts serious trouble and that it has much the same effect as the
common law
(*) rule by which the English law taken by the settlers is both the unwritten law
(common law and equity) and the statute law in force at the time of settlement:
see p.540.
A survey of cases in New Zealand and Pacific countries of decisions where this criterion for a source of law
has been considered has revealed that, without exception, all the statutes in question applied to matters other
than the criminal law: Tony Angelo and Fran Wright, Pitcairn: sunset on Empire? (2004) NZLJ 404, 405. The
writers of this note suggest that one reason for this is perhaps to be found in the principles of legality, due
process and the protection of human rights. I agree that these principles must not be overlooked, but I do not
think that they justify excluding the whole of the criminal law from the generality of the phrase. A more
likely reason is the other one that they give, which is that the usual practice was for a colony to have its own
criminal law so resort to the criminal law of England was unnecessary. The Sexual Offences Act 1956 is a
public general Act which extends to the whole of England and Wales without qualification. In my opinion it
is a statute of general application within the meaning of section 14 of the 1970 Order.
As for the qualification in section 14(2) that the law thus imported was to be in force only so far as “local
circumstances” permit, Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray said at pp 544- 545 that this amounted to no more than the
rounding off of a common law rule and that all the circumstances are to be taken into account including the
local relevance or otherwise of circumstances in England which explain a particular law. In Nyali Ltd v
Attorney-General [1957] 1 QB 1, 16 Lord Denning, speaking about the common law, said that this
qualification was a wise provision, and that it should be liberally construed as a recognition that the common
law cannot be applied in a foreign land without considerable qualification:
“Just as with an English oak, so with the English common law. You cannot transplant it to the African
continent and expect it to retain the tough character which it has in England.”
How statutes of general application in force in England are to be qualified in the light of local circumstances
is less clear. Sir Kenneth notes at p 548 that in a few cases the uncertainty has been reduced by legislative
intervention locally. But none of these problems affect the provisions of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 which
were invoked in this case. As I have said, it is a statute of general application. While some of the sections
that it contains such as those about abduction and the keeping of brothels might have no relevance on Pitcairn,
that is not so in the case of the sections under which these prosecutions were brought. There are no
circumstances either locally on Pitcairn or in England which require the provisions of either section 1 or
section 14 to be qualified in any way.
The promulgation issue
Mr Perry, who appeared for Carlisle Terry Young only but whose argument on this issue was adopted by
counsel for the other appellants, said that he was not attacking the principle of incorporation by reference.
This was, he said, a legitimate device, subject always to the requirement of legal certainty. His point was that
Pitcairn was a wholly exceptional case, and that it was unreasonable to expect an island community of about
50 people to absorb the entirety of a legal system designed to meet the needs of more than 50 million people
in England and Wales. He also submitted that, as the Governor was required by article 5(3) of the Pitcairn
Order 1970 to publish all laws made by him in the exercise of the powers conferred on him by the order and
the date when every such law is to come into operation was to be the date when it was published, publication
was an essential requirement of each any every law that he chose to enact for Pitcairn. So the fact that the
1956 Act had never been published even in summary form on Pitcairn meant that sections 1 and 14 of the Act
were not in force in the islands when these offences were committed.
The question whether, as a matter of form, the requirements of article 5(3) of the 1970 Order were satisfied is
relatively easy to answer. As the Court of Appeal pointed out in paras 37 and 38 of its judgment of 2 March
2006 on abuse of process and the conviction appeals, these requirements extend not just to statutes of general
application but also to the common law and to the rules of equity which are not susceptible to publication in
the way that this argument contemplates. Furthermore the laws that are to be published are those made by the
Governor. The law which he was seeking to make by means of the Judicature Ordinance 1970 was really no
more than declaratory of the existing situation at the commencement of the Order. He was not making new
laws but was providing for the continuation of existing laws, many of which had been part of the law of
Pitcairn since the earliest days of the settlement. It was his own law that he was required to publish, not all
the law that he was incorporating by reference.
But meeting the formalities that the 1970 Order lays down is one thing. Satisfying the principles on which the
rule of law is founded is another. It is here that this method of legislating in the exceptional circumstances of
Pitcairn seem to me to be highly questionable. There is no evidence that the Governor ever applied his mind
to the question whether it was appropriate to apply the Sexual Offences Act 1956 to Pitcairn, and if so which
parts of it were appropriate for application there and which were not. Of course it can be said that the method
of legislating that he chose to adopt made it unnecessary for him to do this. But it is one thing for this
well-established method of legislating to be used in circumstances, such as in New South Wales or New
Zealand, where ample resources existed for finding out what the law was and for obtaining advice about it in
case of doubt. It is quite another to use it in the circumstances of a tiny, remote and isolated community like
Pitcairn, where at the relevant time these resources were entirely absent. As Lord Diplock observed in
Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd [1981] AC 251, 279, elementary justice requires that the rules by which the
citizen is bound should be ascertainable by reference to sources that are accessible. In R v Rimmington
[2005] UKHL 63; [2006] 1 AC 459, 482, para 33 Lord Bingham of Cornhill said:
“There are two guiding principles: no one should be punished under a law unless it is sufficiently clear and
certain to enable him to know what conduct is forbidden before he does it; and no one should be punished for
any act which was not clearly and ascertainably punishable when the act was done.”
The requirement of ascertainability is an essential component of the rule of law. But in the case of statutes of
general application in force in England, as the Governor should have known, it was incapable of being met on
Pitcairn
The use of this method for legislating about the criminal law in the circumstances of Pitcairn is made all the
more unsatisfactory in the light of the steps that were taken when the Judicature Ordinance 1966 was under
preparation to ensure that all its provisions were understood and were acceptable to the Island Council as
representing the whole community on the island. The differences between penalties for committing the
offences described in sections 82 and 88 of the 1966 Ordinance and those which apply to the overlapping
offences described in sections 1 and 14 of the 1956 Act are substantial. The fact that no attempt was made to
reconcile the terminology of the 1966 Ordinance with that of the 1956 Act, or to explain the circumstances in
which the more severe penalties laid down in the Second Schedule to the 1956 Act would be invoked in place
of those provided for by the Ordinance is a further ground for unease.
The turning point
These considerations would have led me to conclude that it was an abuse of process for these prosecutions to
be brought under sections 1 and 14 of the 1956 Act, but for one fact which in the end has persuaded me that
the use of these provisions can be reconciled with the principles of legality. It is to be found in the language
of sections 48 and 52 of the 1861 Act, from which these sections were derived. Section 48 of the 1861 Act
provides:
“Whosoever shall be convicted of the crime of rape shall be guilty of a felony, and being convicted thereof
shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be kept in penal servitude for life or for any term less than
three years, or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour.”
Section 52 of the 1861 Act provides:
“Whosoever shall be convicted of any indecent assault upon any female, or of any attempt to have carnal
knowledge of any girl under twelve years of age, shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be
imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years.”
It can be seen from the way these provisions are worded that they were not creating new crimes. They assume
that the crimes of rape and of indecent assault already exist, as indeed they did as they were already known to
the common law. They were building on the common law to this extent only, that they were prescribing the
penalties that were to attach to these offences. Sections 1 and 14 are differently worded, but their function
was to identify – as was necessary in the days when the 1956 Act was passed – which of the offences it
contained was or was not a felony and to provide, when read together with section 37 and the Second
Schedule, for the prosecution and punishment of these offences. They did not create new crimes, any more
than the 1861 Act had done. The offences mentioned in sections 1 and 14 can therefore be traced back
directly to the common law. There is an air of unreality about the objection that the appellants were
disadvantaged by the fact that the provisions of sections 1 and 14 of the 1956 Act were not ascertainable on
Pitcairn. This case is quite unlike R v Rimmington [2006] 1 AC 459, where the objection was to the
enlargement of the common law crime of causing a public nuisance. Here we are dealing with conduct which
the common law has regarded as criminal for centuries, and the appellants cannot have been in any doubt that
what they were doing amounted to criminal conduct.
This feature of the legislation makes it possible to reconcile the failure to promulgate the fact that the 1956
Act was to be part of the laws of Pitcairn with the principle of legality. The islanders brought the common
law of England with them when they settled there. Rape and indecent assault were part of the criminal law of
the island long before the Justice Ordinance 1966 and the Judicature Ordinances 1961 and 1970 were
enacted. No objection could have been taken on the ground of lack of promulgation if the prosecution of the
appellants had been brought under the common law. The only practical difference that resulted from bringing
the prosecutions under the statute was as to the sentences that were available. But the effect of the statute was
simply to replace the common law, under which there was no limit to the length of any sentence that could be
imposed, by the statutory maxima. Substitution of the statutory system for the common law which leaves
everything to the judge’s discretion works in favour of the accused, not against him. This reduces the risk of
any unfairness. It is not possible to detect any unfairness in the sentences imposed on any of the appellants,
which were not challenged in the Court of Appeal. My noble and learned friend Lord Woolf is not sure why
this assists: see para 14. The answer, I suggest, is to be found in the point which he makes in the next
paragraph. We are dealing here with acts which were wrong in themselves. So I do not think that it was an
affront to justice for them to be prosecuted for such acts under the statute.
It would have been open to question whether these convictions could have been sustained on the ground that
the offences were contrary to the common law and that it was unnecessary to proceed under the statute. As a
general rule the prosecutor is tied to the ground that he chooses to fight on. If he decides to prosecute
under a statute, it is not open to him to ask for a conviction under the common law unless the statute in
question provides for this as an alternative. But I do not need to resolve this issue as I have concluded,
although not without difficulty, that as sections 1 and 14 of the 1956 Act were not creating new crimes it
was open to the prosecutor to bring the prosecutions under the statute notwithstanding its lack of
promulgation.
I wish finally to associate myself with all that Lord Woolf has said about the way in which these proceedings
were conducted by both sides and by the courts below. I also pay tribute to the careful way in which the
papers were prepared both in hard copy and electronically for our use by both sides in these appeals, and to
the conspicuous fairness and sensitivity with which these proceedings have been conducted throughout by the
Public Prosecutor.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
*
common law rule :
Ceci est typiquement et - jusqu'à plus ample information - exclusivement propre à la législation
britannique.
Aucun équivalent juridique de cette "réglementation par la loi commune" ne peut valablement se
trouver comparé en droit constitutionnel à aucune autre législation de par le monde; regardant le droit
constitutionnel, le Royaume-Uni constitue par ailleurs une exception notable.
En effet les sujets de droit britanniques ne connaissent aucune loi fondamentale dite "Constitution",
loi fondamentale c'est-à-dire instituée en norme supérieure extraordinaire, laquelle norme supérieure
énonce les conditions d'élaboration de toute norme, lois, décrets, ordonnances ou règlements autrement
applicables ou révisables à tout moment par le pouvoir législatif dans les conditions ordinaires.
(voir 3., depuis Bruxelles, récit fait par journal Le Soir)

 

ABEL ET CAÏN, NOÉ, LOT ET SES DEUX FILLES
Essai d'exégèse rationaliste agnostique

Les Anciens disaient : « Ton frère est un autre toi-même : c’est pourquoi tu aimeras ton frère comme toi-même » (tradition pythagoricienne)

Que dit l’Ancien Testament de l’opprobre éternel autour de Caïn meurtrier de son frère Abel ? Cette éternelle approche de l’envie qui se mue en folie fratricide ne se révèle-t-elle pas, à l’aube de l’humanité, davantage qu’une supercherie apologétique, plutôt une allégorie dont il nous est moins facile à présent d’approcher l’authenticité ?
Que retient-on d’une lecture positive des Ecritures du Livre, si ce n’est dans ce cas la compétition que les Patriarches pouvaient se représenter entre éleveurs et cultivateurs, entre les bergers, sacrificateurs ou autres chevilleurs (dits « Abel ») d’un côté, et de l’autre, les cultivateurs, moissonneurs ou autres semeurs de zizanie (dits « Caïn ») ?

PROLEGOMENES
« De la treizième à la quinzième année intervient la production des hormones masculines dans les testicules. La production maximale est atteinte entre vingt-cinq et trente ans. En plus de cette formation de testostérone, des androgènes de plus faible action sont produites dans les capsules surrénales. »

« Tandis qu’intervient la formation d’androgènes, une formation d’oestrogènes, hormones féminines, se produit aussi. Dans l’organisme masculin, il y a donc aussi bien production d’hormones féminines que d’hormones masculines. Les hormones féminines proviennent de réactions métaboliques endocriniennes entre testicules et capsules surrénales et, dans différents organes dont le foie, une quantité d’hormones masculines est transformée en oestrogènes. La fonction de ces hormones féminines dans l’organisme masculin n’est pas connue avec précision.» Texte explicatif de Helga Fleischhauer-Hardt, extrait de « Laat’s zien ! » sélection de photos sur le sexe pour enfants et parents, Kosmos-Amsterdam, 1975, titre original « Zeig mal ! », Jugenddienst-Verlag, Wuppertal, 1974 ; http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeig_mal ! [Traduction partielle du texte allemand, voir ci-après]

« Les primates constituent un cas particulier, en ce que l’activité sexuelle peut avoir lieu à tous les moments du cycle ovarien. Cependant, dans les conditions naturelles chez le macaque et les anthropoïdes, la fréquence de l’activité sexuelle varie considérablement, et suit l’évolution des oestrogènes. Elle atteint donc un maximum au voisinage de l’ovulation.
« Chez le mâle, on a longtemps considéré que la sécrétion d’androgènes était continue ou subissait des variations progressives. Mais les dosages effectués dans le sang à intervalles très rapprochés donnent une image très différente : le taux de testostérone varie considérablement au cours de la journée, cette hormone étant sécrétée en une série de « bouffées ». On n’observe toutefois aucune variation concomitante de la motivation sexuelle. »
« La mise en oeuvre du comportement spécifique de chaque sexe pourra dépendre de la nature chimique des hormones, mais aussi de leur rythme de sécrétion, et d’une sexualisation des formations nerveuses sur lesquelles elles agissent. »
« Une étude expérimentale a été entreprise en injectant à des animaux castrés ou ovariectomisés des hormones différentes selon les modalités de l’un ou de l’autre sexe. Les résultats sont inattendus : une seule injection d’hormone mâle (testostérone) à une femelle produit chez elle l’apparition d’un comportement sexuel femelle entièrement normal. De même, des traitements répétés d’oestrogènes permettent au castrat la récupération de son comportement mâle. Il apparaît donc qu’il n’y a guère de spécificité dans l’effet des hormones mâles (androgènes) ou femelles (oestrogènes) en ce qui concerne le comportement sexuel, à l’opposé de ce qui se passe pour des organes cibles autres que le cerveau comme l’appareil génital où l’action de chacune est hautement différenciée. »
Syndrome d'insensibilité complète aux androgènes ou http://www.rch.org.au/emplibrary/chic/SICA.pdf

« Certaines régions du système nerveux central sont en effet capables de réaliser la transformation des androgènes en oestrogènes par aromatisation. Cette voie métabolique interviendrait dans l’utilisation des hormones pour la mise en oeuvre du comportement sexuel. Si on injecte des androgènes qui ne peuvent être transformés de cette manière (comme la dihydro-testostérone) on n’observe pratiquement pas d’effet sur le comportement sexuel. Pourtant ce composé est très actif sur l’appareil génital du mâle. »
[addendum, 2006] Is brain estradiol a hormone or a neurotransmitter?

Trends in Neurosciences Volume 29, Issue 5 , May 2006, Pages 241-249

« Si on traite tous les jours une femelle ovariectomisée par des androgènes ou des oestrogènes, c’est-à-dire selon un rythme de type mâle, on voit apparaître un comportement de type mâle complet (parade, monte etc.) Le système nerveux de la femelle possède donc une bisexualité potentielle que le rythme des injections hormonales permet de révéler. Par contre, une seule injection (rythme femelle) d’androgènes ou d’oestrogènes est sans effet sur le castrat. Le système nerveux mâle apparaît donc quant à lui, sexualisé, capable seulement d’un seul type de réponse. » Jean-Pierre SIGNORET, Directeur de laboratoire - INRA (Le comportement animal - Science et Vie, n°125 - hors série, 1978)

Parade sexuelle et ritualisation de la pariade chez l’Oie cendrée : la femelle doit presque s’immiscer dans le « ballet triomphal » de deux jars pour qu’une copulation efficace ait lieu. Après compétition, émulation des deux jars pour l’accompagnement de la femelle dans la couvade, et jusqu’à maturité des oisillons, les circonstances climatiques changeant, il y a transhumance et le troupeau abandonne ses quartiers d’hiver pour le Grand Nord. Cf. Konrad LORENZ, "L'agression, une histoire naturelle du mal" - Flammarion, 1969 (Chap. XI - Le Lien), titre original : "Das sogenannte Böse zur Naturgeschichte der Agression" - Verlag Dr G. Borotha-Schoeler, 1963.

Des mesures statistiques effectuées depuis les années 1930 dans l’ensemble de la population humaine (échelle statistique de MORGAN reprenant les taux testostérone/oestrogène) confirment une proportion constante d’individus, dits intersexués, dont le taux hormonal se situe à l’inverse par rapport au sexe caryotypique.
Quelle est l’origine d'une différenciation sexuelle du système nerveux qui conditionne leur comportement, bien qu'ils soient animaux ni castrés ni ovariectomisés ? Le comportement sexuel des intersexués peut-il être présumé ?
Combien as-tu de sexes : 1, 2, 3, 5, multiples ? ou

http://www.vrais-visages.net/spip.php?article37

Une fois libéré des contraintes d’observation dans le grand laboratoire humain, le dit « meilleur ami de l’Homme » - ce chien qu’on habitue à saliver au son d’une cloche - va-t-il tenter d’agir sur la cloche pour satisfaire sa faim ? Controverse entre Liddel et Pavlov : au grand dam de ce dernier, la réponse est positive. Ivan Petrovitch Pavlov fut à l’origine du dit « conditionnement psychologique » et de la théorie behavioriste.

http://www.genethique.org/doss_theme/dossiers/chrono_bioethique/instances_bioethique.htm

APOCRYPHE DE SETH
« Mon frère adoré ! » N’est-il pas piquant de se faire traiter de la sorte.., à distance, quand aucune chance n’est laissée pour la plus légitime des ripostes ?! Mais laissons là ces escarmouches, nul ne saura jamais que si nous nous appelons l’un l’autre en secret Jimmy, c’est parce qu’il a fallu que nous naissions le même jour, et de la même mère ! Et comble de misère, du fait du va-et-vient des nurses, et de la précipitation de l’accoucheur, personne n’a pu conserver la mémoire de celui qui devait, de nous deux, exercer le droit d’aînesse... Nous a-t-il fallu de la patience pour nous supporter l’un l’autre, nous autres deux gémeaux - comme on les voit parmi les signes du zodiaque - alors que, parmi tous ces signes, nous allions, à quelques instants près, aborder sous la même étoile une heureuse et commune existence ?
Mon cher frère, de quoi s’agit-il ? Nos familles, et les enfants de nos enfants, et leurs enfants et petits-enfants, se sont disputé le Paradis à un tel point que l’Eternel fit tomber le Déluge, d’où Noé devait réchapper. « Et Noé commença à être cultivateur et il planta une vigne; et il but du vin, et il s’enivra et se découvrit au milieu de la tente. Et Cham, père de Canaan, vit la nudité de son père, et le rapporta à ses deux frères, dehors. Et Sem et Japhet prirent le manteau et le mirent, les deux, sur leurs épaules et marchèrent en arrière et couvrirent la nudité de leur père; et leur visage était tourné en arrière, et ils ne virent pas la nudité de leur père. Et Noé se réveilla de son vin et sut ce que lui avait fait son plus jeune fils; et il dit : Maudit soit Canaan ! Il sera l’esclave des esclaves de ses frères. Et il dit : Béni soit l’Eternel, le Dieu de Sem, et que Canaan soit son esclave ! » (Genèse 9, 20-26)
Noé, funeste inventeur du racisme.

Longtemps après cela.., mais que rapporte donc le Livre ?

« Et l’Eternel fit pleuvoir des cieux sur Sodome et sur Gomorrhe du soufre et du feu, de la part de l’Eternel; et Il détruisit ces villes, et toute la plaine, et tous les habitants des villes, et les plantes de la terre. Et la femme de Lot regarda en arrière, et elle devint une statue de sel. » (Genèse 19, 24- 26)
Car il est vrai que l’iniquité des habitants de Sodome et de Gomorrhe était telle qu’elle méritait de l’Eternel ce châtiment. Mais qu’advint-il ensuite à Lot ?
« Et Lot monta de Tsoar, et habita dans la montagne, et ses deux filles avec lui; car il eut peur d’habiter dans Tsoar; et il habita dans une caverne, lui et ses deux filles.» (Genèse 19, 30) « Et elles firent boire du vin à leur père cette nuit-là aussi; et la plus jeune se leva, et coucha avec lui; et il ne s’aperçut ni quand elle se coucha, ni quand elle se leva. Et les deux filles de Lot conçurent de leur père.» (Genèse 19, 35-36)

Lot commence par apprendre qu’il est extrêmement périlleux de se livrer à l’homosexualité, au point qu’il fuit la ville et se réfugie, seul avec ses deux filles, dans une caverne.
Mais faut-il alors s’étonner que celles-ci finissent par abuser de lui, et commettre l’inceste ?
Lot, malheureux initiateur du sexisme.

Quelques liens :

OMS  Les mutilations sexuelles feminines

Association contre la Mutilation des Enfants

Query 'excision' fr=etat-droit-justice.pdf

circabolition (groupe MSN)

Quelle attitude adopter face aux enfants curieux s’éveillant à leur propre sexualité ?
http://www.alternativesante.com/gazette/sections/section.asp?NoSection=28&NoArticle=459

[Wikipedia.de: sur "Zeig Mal" ci-après traduction sommaire de la page une]
"Fais-voir ! (de l’allemand „Zeig Mal !“) 

Revue des Wikipedia, l'encyclopédie libre

"Fais-voir! est un livre d’éducation sexuelle, livre lucide et clairement destiné aux enfants, publié en 1974. L’auteur est Will McBride.
"Dans ce livre, des instantanés interpelleront les enfants curieux s’éveillant à leur propre sexualité. Comme le feraient des fiches de tournage, les textes d’accompagnement reproduisent leurs commentaires pris sur le vif.
"Dès sa parution, le livre atteignit une cote élevée; il fut ensuite plusieurs fois primé.
"Dans les années 1990, par suite de présentations moralisatrices, un changement de point de vue critique est intervenu vis-à-vis de l’ouvrage. "Quelques groupes voulaient interdire le livre et n'ont atteint leur objectif qu'aux Etats-unis d’Amérique du Nord.
"Sur la base de ces querelles, l’auteur Will McBride n’a pas consenti à une nouvelle édition de son ouvrage." [modifier]
Weblinks
À des informations sur «Fais-voir !» et d'autres livres d'éducation sexuelle
La distinction accordée à Will Mc.Bride